What Is Provisional Right

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10693994
AutoresMartin Jay Stone (0009-0004-2940-0179, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law), Ruqaiya Hasan (0000-0002-2846-0004, Amherst College), Rafeeq Hasan (Amherst College)
Año2022
Volumen131
Número1
Páginas51-98
Fecha de publicación2022-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-9415141
OpenAlexW4221085282
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas9

Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such claims are merely “provisional”; they become “conclusive” only in a civil condition involving political institutions. Kant’s commentators find this thesis puzzling, since it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property’s conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action (that of acquiring ordinary rights) where public authorization is lacking. Provisional right thereby functions as a methodological device in a sequential elucidation of the moral basis of public law. To develop this reading, we first explain Kant’s two-step account of property rights—his division between ‘having’ and ‘acquiring’. Then we explain what is involved in a sequential exposition of right more generally

Action (physics) · Contradiction · Epistemology · Exclusive right · Exposition (narrative) · Intellectual property · Law and economics · Moral rights · Political science · Politics · Property (philosophy) · Property rights · Sociology · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Law · Legal principles and applications · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics