Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10694326 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Michael Huemer (0000-0002-2346-3468, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2000 |
| Volumen | 109 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 525-544 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2000-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 |
| OpenAlex | W1979164838 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 39 |
Research Article| October 01 2000 Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument Michael Huemer Michael Huemer Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (4): 525–544. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Huemer; Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2000; 109 (4): 525–544. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-4-525 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2000 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content
Argument (complex analysis) · Citation · Download · Icon · Programming language · World Wide Web · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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| Obras citantes distintas | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,63 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2002 - 2025 (24) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 38 |