Putnam's Argument Against Realism
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10695794 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John Koethe (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1979 |
| Volumen | 88 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 92 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1979-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184780 |
| OpenAlex | W2315928823 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 7 |
IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representation [or theory] we have of it-indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent WORLD at all
Analytic philosophy · Argument (complex analysis) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Realism · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,15 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1980 - 1996 (17) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 7 |