Future Desires, the Agony Argument, and Subjectivism about Reasons

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10695974
AutoresEden Lin (0000-0001-8210-8995, The Ohio State University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen129
Número1
Páginas95-130
Fecha de publicación2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-7890481
OpenAlexW2999338008
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas3
Referencias citadas47

Extant discussions of subjectivism about reasons for action have concentrated on presentist versions of the theory, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present desires. In this article, I motivate and investigate the prospects of futurist subjectivism, on which reasons for present actions are grounded in present or future desires. Futurist subjectivism promises to answer Parfit's Agony Argument, and it is motivated by natural extensions of some of the considerations that support subjectivism in general. However, it faces a problem: because which desires one will have in the future can depend on what one does now, it must tell us which of one's possible future desires give one reasons to promote their satisfaction. I argue that the most natural solutions to this problem are unsatisfactory: they either fail to answer the Agony Argument or have unacceptable implications elsewhere. Then, I propose a more promising solution. Moreover, I argue that a closely analogous problem arises for an important class of idealizing subjectivist views and that this problem admits of a similar solution

Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Austrian School · Economics · Epistemology · Natural (archaeology) · Neoclassical economics · Objectivism · Subjectivism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification