Epistemic Relativism

In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed aim of Fear of Knowledge, to dislodge relativistic conviction, could not be served even if Boghossian's argument worked perfectly on its own terms. The eponymous fear, and not rational argument, is the source of much of the relativistic conviction to be found at large in the culture. And Fear of Knowledge simply does not address this fear

Argument (complex analysis) · Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Contemporary philosophy · Conviction · Epistemology · General interest · Political science · Relativism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

• Immanuel Kant

  Immanuel Kant, Christine M Korsgaard et al.•Kant•1998

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• Fear of Knowledge

  Paul Boghossian, Paul Artin Boghossian•FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE: AGAINST…•2006

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• Relativism and disagreement

  Open Access•John Macfarlane•Philosophical Studies•2007

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• Color Pluralism

  Mark Eli Kalderon•The Philosophical Review•2007

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• Color Properties and Color Ascriptions

  Jonathan Cohen•The Philosophical Review•2004

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