Hard-Type Soft Facts
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 10697435 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John Martin Fischer (0000-0002-1685-4743, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1986 |
| Volumen | 95 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 591 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1986-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185052 |
| OpenAlex | W2316120308 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
There is a quite general argument which purports to establish that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom to do otherwise.' The argument proceeds from the claim that the past is fixed-out of our control-to the conclusion that if a certain sort of God exists, then no human is ever free to do otherwise. One way of resisting the argument is Ockhamism. The Ockhamist distinguishes between two sorts of facts about the past: genuine, non-relational facts (hard facts), which are now fixed, and non-genuine, relational facts (soft facts), which needn't be fixed now. Further, the Ockhamist claims that certain facts alleged by the incompatibilist to be hard facts are in the class of soft facts which are not fixed, and thus that the incompatibilist's argument is unsound
Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Type (biology) · Free Will and Agency · Geology · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Obras citantes distintas | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,24 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1989 - 2024 (36) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 6 |