Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10698027
AutoresRuth Garrett Millikan (0000-0003-1513-1049, autor de correspondencia)
Año1990
Volumen99
Número3
Páginas323
Fecha de publicación1990-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2185347
OpenAlexW1522736553
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas29

The challenge is a welcome one. Although I will argue that the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox is not a problem for naturalists only, I will propose a naturalist solution to it. (Should the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox prove to be soluble from a naturalist standpoint but intractable from other standpoints, that would, I suppose, constitute an argument for naturalism.) Then I will show that the paradox and its solution have an important consequence for the theories of meaning and truth. The Kripke-Wittgenstein arguments which pose the paradox also put in question Dummett's and Putnam's view of language understanding. From this view it follows that truth must be verificationist rules that assign assertability conditions to sentences, rather than realist rules that assign correspondence truth conditions. The proposed solution to the paradox suggests another view of language understanding, according to which a speaker can express, through his language practice, a grasp of correspondence truth rules. This will block one route of Putnam's famous retreat from realism

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Kripke semantics · Kripke structure · Multimodal logic · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies · Philosophy