Truth in Context

An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10698544
AutoresDorothy Grover, Michael Patrick Lynch (0000-0001-9535-6461)
Año2001
Volumen110
Número1
Páginas98
Fecha de publicación2001-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditorialJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2693605
OpenAlexW2150377036
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12

A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naive. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or soft concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Objectivity (philosophy) · Pluralism (philosophy) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications