The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10763556
AutoresAaron Dusso (0000-0002-4028-2482, Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis), Thomas T Holyoke (0000-0001-8763-9525, California State University, Fresno, autor de correspondencia), Henrik Schatzinger (Ripon College)
Año2019
Volumen100
Número5
Páginas1793-1809
Fecha de publicación2019-08-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSocial Science Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0038-4941 • E-ISSN: 1540-6237
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ssqu.12665
OpenAlexW2945497610
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas51

Objective Corporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here. Methods We approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts. Results Our analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards. Conclusion These results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts

Business · Economics · Executive branch · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Procurement · Yield (engineering) · Corporate Finance and Governance · Law · Marketing · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration