Rethinking the role of language in arguments for extended cognition

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10807151
AutoresZoe Drayson (0000-0002-1665-3319, University of California, Davis, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen206
Número1
Fecha de publicación2025-06-20
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-025-05079-3
OpenAlexW4411490825
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas28

Clark ( Philosophical Psychology 19(3):291–307, 2006) proposes that a standard challenge to the hypothesis of extended cognition can be avoided in the case of linguistically structured cognition, because the role played by our public manipulation of linguistic artifacts is irreducible to the role played by the brain’s operations over internal representations. I demonstrate that Clark’s argument relies on a view of the brain’s cognitive architecture to which he no longer subscribes. I argue that on Clark’s later view of the brain as engaged in ‘predictive processing’, his earlier defense of extended cognition from this challenge is no longer an effective strategy. I explore the implications of this for Clark’s attempts to reconcile his previous arguments for extended cognition with his characterization of the predictive-processing brain

Argument (complex analysis) · Cognition · Cognitive architecture · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Action Observation and Synchronization · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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