Problems of empirical solutions to the theory-ladenness of observation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID10814945
AutoresThemistoklis Pantazakos (0000-0002-4993-191X, University College London, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen199
Número5-6
Páginas12985-13007
Fecha de publicación2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditorialSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03363-6
OpenAlexW3196019411
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas43

Recent years have seen enticing empirical approaches to solving the epistemological problem of the theory-ladenness of observation. I group these approaches in two categories according to their method of choice: testing and refereeing. I argue that none deliver what friends of theory-neutrality want them to. Testing does not work because both evidence from cognitive neuroscience and perceptual pluralism independently invalidate the existence of a common observation core. Refereeing does not work because it treats theory-ladenness as a kind of superficial, removable bias. Even if such treatment is plausible, there is likely no method to ascertain that effects of this bias are not present. More importantly, evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that a deeper, likely irremovable kind of theory-ladenness lies within the perceptual modules

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Core (optical fiber) · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Neutrality · Perception · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Pluralism (philosophy) · Cognitive Neuroscience · Computer Science · Infectious Encephalopathies and Encephalitis · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology