Politically connected cities
Italy 1951–1991
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11080378 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Guglielmo Barone (University of Bologna, autor de correspondencia), Guido de Blasio (0000-0002-2800-2038, Bank of Italy), Elena Gentili (Bank of Italy) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 145 |
| Páginas | 103733 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Urban Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0094-1190 • E-ISSN: 1095-9068 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jue.2024.103733 |
| OpenAlex | W4406203086 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 31 |
This paper documents the higher growth experienced by politically connected municipalities in Italy between the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. It leverages the peculiarities of the institutional setting and compares population growth in connected and unconnected municipalities with similar characteristics at the beginning of the period. Our results indicate a population premium of 7.4% over 40 years. Connected municipalities benefited from the location of state-owned enterprises, more infrastructures and higher public spending. Political connections favored industrialization, higher employment and wages, but crowded out private entrepreneurship. Local communities repaid these benefits through voting. There is no evidence of higher agglomeration economies in politically connected cities, suggesting that political connections have not been output-enhancing from a nationwide perspective. The difference in population growth rates fades away after the end of the connections
Business · Economic geography · Economics · Geography · Political science · Regional science · European history and politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Doubly robust difference-in-differences estimators
Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies, and the Big Push
Estimating the Value of Political Connections
Regional Favoritism
Political connections and preferential access to finance
Trade and Circuses
GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence
Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
The ‘long night of the first republic’
Appointed public officials and local favoritism
Political favoritism in China’s capital markets and its effect on city sizes
Do political connections help or hinder urban economic growth? Evidence from 1,400 industrial parks in China
Evidence on the political economy of the urbanization process
State intervention and economic growth in Southern Italy
Making Democracy Work
Using Place-Based Jobs Policies to Help Distressed Communities
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |