Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games
1
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11286407 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Pradeep Dubey (0000-0001-5853-0619, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, autor de correspondencia), Mamoru Kaneko (0000-0001-6858-9139, University of Tsukuba) |
| Año | 1984 |
| Volumen | 8 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 111-139 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1984-10-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Mathematical Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0165-4896 • E-ISSN: 1879-3118 |
| Editorial | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8 |
| OpenAlex | W1966920312 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 4 |
Best response · Complete information · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Normal-form game · Relation (database · Repeated game · Strategy · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics
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| Citas por año | 0,12 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 1985 - 2019 (35) |
| Altamente citado | No |