Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games
A reply to Sloof
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11607993 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Eric Rasmusen (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1997 |
| Volumen | 91 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 209-214 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1997-04-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Public Choice (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0048-5829 • E-ISSN: 1573-7101 |
| Editorial | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1023/a:1004903313621 |
| OpenAlex | W1555690637 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 5 |
Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Public finance · Repeated game · Strategy · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
| Altamente citado | No |
|---|