Legislative Incentives and Two-Tiered Judicial Review

A Game Theoretic Reading of Carolene Products Footnote Four

Datos Bibliográficos

ID11623969
AutoresJames R Rogers (0000-0001-5335-2358, autor de correspondencia)
Año1999
Volumen43
Número4
Páginas1096-1096
Fecha de publicación1999-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2991819
OpenAlexW2318820423
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas4

U.S. v. Carolene Products footnote four is great and modem charter for ordering the relation between judges and other agencies of government. Under the footnote, the rigor of judicial review is selected in response to whether a statute's enactment reflects or affects ordinary majoritarian processes. Often neglected, however, is that the process criterion did not originate with the Fourteenth Amendment concerns of the footnote, but originated in the early tax and commerce jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Drawing upon the jurisprudence in these precedents, a simple game theoretic model is developed of the footnote's suspect legislative incentive structure. Doing so illuminates several controversies surrounding the footnote's doctrine and application: the majoritarian basis for the Court's countermajoritarian prerogative and the type of discrete and insular minority groups that qualify for heightened judicial review. It also corrects the common misconception that the footnote excludes economic regulations from heightened judicial scrutiny

Charter · Doctrine · Economics · Judicial review · Jurisprudence · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Prerogative · Scrutiny · Statute · Supreme court · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies