Big field, small potatoes
An empirical assessment of EPA's self‐audit policy
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11683406 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alexander Pfaff (0000-0002-6886-6906, Columbia University, autor de correspondencia), Chris William Sanchirico (William P. Wharton Trust) |
| Año | 2004 |
| Volumen | 23 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 415-432 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2004-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0276-8739 • E-ISSN: 1520-6688 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/pam.20027 |
| OpenAlex | W3124608320 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 11 |
| Referencias citadas | 12 |
Environmental self‐auditing is said to deserve and require encouragement. Although firms can audit themselves more cheaply and effectively than regulators, they are deterred for fear that information they uncover will be used against them. To reduce this disincentive, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Audit Policy lowers punitive fines when firms promptly disclose and correct self‐discovered violations. While some contend that the Audit Policy is inadequate, EPA touts its success based on the policy's track record. Our examination of that track record leads us to question EPA's claim. Comparing the violations in these cases with those detected by standard EPA enforcement suggests that the typical self‐audited violation is relatively minor. Cases arising under the Policy are more likely to concern reporting violations and less likely to concern emissions. The relative insignificance of self‐audited violations raises a number of policy questions, including whether the Audit Policy should be revised to play a larger role in enforcement. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
Agency (philosophy · Audit · Business · Economics · Enforcement · Environmental audit · Insignificance · Political science · Public economics · Punitive damages · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Accounting
Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self‐policing
The effect of compliance assistance on pollution discharges and violations of environmental regulations
Self‐Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable
Environmental protection after civil war
Self-Policing and the Environment
Does self-policing reduce chemical emissions
Consequences of an Anti‐Corruption Experiment for Local Government Performance in Brazil
Corporate Self‐policing and the Environment
Secondary learning and the unintended benefits of collaborative mechanisms
The Politics of Detection in Business Regulation
Does the Modernization of Environmental Enforcement Reduce Toxic Releases? An Examination of Self-policing, Criminal Prosecutions, and Toxic Releases in the United States, 1988-2014
| Obras citantes distintas | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,41 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1999 - 2025 (27) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 11 |