Saltar al contenido principal

ETHNOS_APP

Inicio • Búsqueda • Revistas • Lista 0

The Congressional Veto

Shifting the Balance of Administrative Control

Datos Bibliográficos

ID11684206
AutoresRobert S Gilmour (autor de correspondencia)
Año1982
Volumen2
Número1
Páginas13-13
Fecha de publicación1982-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Policy Analysis and Management (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0276-8739 • E-ISSN: 1520-6688
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/3323647
OpenAlexW1981254837
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4

During the past decade, hundreds of provisions have been enacted by Congress giving that body some form of control over the projects and regulations of federal agencies. Pressures for more far-reaching measures of this sort, including a proposal to vest Congress with a veto of all regulations promulagated by federal agencies, have intensified debate on both the constitutional merits and administrative wisdom of the congressional veto process. These measures are exerting considerable effect, delaying the decisions of the agencies, reshaping the regulatory process, and increasing the direct congressional role in setting administrative agendas and substantive policies. The result is a transfer of administrative power to the more than 200 standing committees and subcommittees of the Congress-and, significantly, to their staffs. This transfer has served to impede the executive chain of command, to diminish the role of independent regulatory agencies as experts in their respective fields, to devalue judicial review of agency action, and to reduce the accountability of the affected agencies

Balance (ability · Business · Control (management · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Physical medicine and rehabilitation · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Veto · Law · Law, Rights, and Freedoms · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Medicine · Public Administration

  • Interest Group Influence on State Administrative Rule Making

    Open Access•Nathan D Woods•The American Review of Public…•2005

  • Separation of Powers and the Politics of Administrative Rule Review

    Open Access•Nathan D Woods•State Politics & Policy Quarterly•2015

  • The Ombudsman in a Political Context

    Open Access•Robert D Lee•International Review of…•1991

  • The Legislative Veto

    Joseph Cooper, Joseph Cooper Cooper et al.•Congress & the Presidency•1983

Obras citantes distintas4
Citas por año0,09
Intervalo de citas1983 - 2015 (33)
Velocidad de citaciónhistorical
Altamente citadoNo
Tipos de citaNeutras: 4

Herramientas

Abrir DOISci-HubOpen Access
Ethnos_APP • Proyecto Open Source • Licencia MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidad y Cookies • Documentación de la API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código de la API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código del Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae