Biopsychism

Life between computation and cognition

Datos Bibliográficos

ID11936639
AutoresFermín C Fulda (0000-0002-4431-5106, University of Toronto, autor de correspondencia)
Año2020
Volumen45
Número3
Páginas315-330
Fecha de publicación2020-07-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaInterdisciplinary Science Reviews (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0308-0188 • E-ISSN: 1743-2790
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03080188.2020.1794381
OpenAlexW3090052616
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas36

The computational metaphor of organisms as phenotypic automata controlled by a genetic programme has been replaced by the cognitive metaphor of organisms as intelligent agents making decisions about how to use their genomic and environmental resources. This metaphor facilitates novel ways of thinking about organisms that defy the assumptions of the old machine metaphor. But like all metaphors, the cognitive metaphor discloses important similarities at the expense of eclipsing significant dissimilarities. I argue that although cognitivism carries with it the crucial insight that living organisms are agents rather than mere automata, this metaphor distorts the nature of biological agency by over-intellectualizing, which risks eliminating the distinction between life and mind. I trace the Cartesian root of these metaphors and argue that it generates a dilemma between mechanism and intellectualism. To capture the middle path that most organisms occupy between these two extremes, I propose an ecological account of natural agency

Algorithm · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Computation · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Origins and Evolution of Life · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology