Was Paul Hirst ever a Deweyan
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 11952308 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jau-wei Dan (University of Taipei, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 57 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 104-134 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-01-19 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Philosophy of Education (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0309-8249 • E-ISSN: 1467-9752 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopedu/qhad004 |
| OpenAlex | W4317508178 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 4 |
It is widely known that Paul Hirst had two theories of education in his academic career. He had been conscious of this intellectual transformation and felt quite positive about it. From the perspective of intellectual history and curiosity about his personal intellectual development, I try, following leads from my private correspondence and conversations with him in the 1990s, to touch on the following questions: How does Hirst see his two theories? Why does he think his early theory cannot stand? Is his personal account adequate in explaining his own intellectual shift? How is it that his later theory seems to suggest John Dewey’s pragmatism? Was Paul Hirst ever a Deweyan? In tackling these questions, I sketch Hirst’s two theories, point out the differences and continuities between them, offer a suggestion as to why Hirst’s early theory cannot stand, and give a short account of Dewey’s theory of education. My conclusion is that even if his later theory might be said to suggest a Deweyan approach, Paul Hirst was never a Deweyan
Curiosity · Education theory · Epistemology · Higher education · Perspective (graphical · Pragmatism · Sketch · Sociology · Education and Critical Thinking Development · Mathematics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology · Religious Education and Schools · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology
| Citas por año | 0,33 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Altamente citado | No |