Under Cover
Substituting Formal IOs during Hard Times
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 12159809 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Yoram Z Haftel (0000-0002-8142-9647, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, autor de correspondencia), Stephanie C Hofmann (0000-0003-0045-8356, European University Institute) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 39 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 130-144 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-01-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Ethics & International Affairs (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0892-6794 • E-ISSN: 1747-7093 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0892679425100117 |
| OpenAlex | W4413409698 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 40 |
Recent times have been hard for global governance, not least for formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). Given changing conditions and their inability to adapt, many observers argue that FIGOs are drifting and losing ground to low-cost institutions (LCIs). We argue that this widespread perception is incomplete and that it dismisses too quickly the durability of FIGOs. We begin by pointing out that not all FIGOs are drifting and that some may even thrive amid transnational crises and power shifts. We then highlight the possibility that in a densely institutionalized global environment, states can substitute one FIGO for another. Thus, even as one FIGO is drifting, other FIGOs, rather than or alongside LCIs, can take the mantle. We identify and exemplify three key motivations for FIGO substitution: overcoming gridlock, enhancing ideological alignment, and policy laundering. During crises and power shifts, some members might paralyze a FIGO, leading to gridlock and prompting other members to cooperate in another FIGO. Power shifts and crises can also motivate dissatisfied FIGO members to pursue parallel activities in a FIGO that better fits their ideological outlook. Policy laundering occurs when members use one FIGO over another to signal political intent. We conclude by exploring the normative implications of FIGO substitution
Cover (algebra · Business Process Modeling and Analysis · Computer Science · Engineering · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Mechanical Engineering
Institutional Choice and Global Commerce
European Security in Nato's Shadow
A Theory of International Organization
Contested multilateralism
Informal governance in world politics
The global governance complexity cube
The polycrisis and EU security and defence competences
The Gray Area of Institutional Change
Interfering via Asean? In the Case of Disaster Management
Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance
International regime complexity in sovereign crisis finance
Investing in international security
Russia and the Liberal World Order
After Liberal Hegemony
EU economic governance and Covid-19
The politics of overlapping organizations
Introduction
The New Terrain of Global Governance
Rivalry and Overlap
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Elastic Relations
Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations
Angling for Influence
The Short and Long(er) of It
Playing Favorites
Covid-19 and the Politics of Crisis
Once Bitten, Twice Shy? Investment Disputes, State Sovereignty, and Change in Treaty Design
Ideology and Legitimacy in Global Governance
Dialectical Order-Making through Ambiguity
Institutional design for a post-liberal order
Legacies and innovations in global economic governance since Bretton Woods
The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources
Institutional authority and security cooperation within regional economic organizations
Ad hoc coalitions in global governance
How ad hoc coalitions deinstitutionalize international institutions
| Citas por año | 3 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Altamente citado | No |