The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 12166350 |
|---|---|
| Autores | George Farmer (0000-0003-2882-0310, Division of Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology University of Manchester Manchester UK, autor de correspondencia), Paul A Warren (0000-0002-4071-7650, Division of Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology University of Manchester Manchester UK), Wael El‐Deredy (0000-0002-9822-1092, Division of Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology University of Manchester Manchester UK), Andrew Howes (0000-0003-4251-1127, School of Computer Science University of Birmingham Birmingham UK) |
| Año | 2016 |
| Volumen | 30 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 785-793 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-12-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0894-3257 • E-ISSN: 1099-0771 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/bdm.2001 |
| PMID | 29081595 |
| OpenAlex | W2562195126 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 38 |
The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value-maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value-maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal
Attraction · Choice set · Context (archaeology · Decision maker · Econometrics · Economics · Management science · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Preference · Set (abstract data type · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Behavioral Health and Interventions · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Mathematics
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 5 |