Manufacturing a Consensus
Nazi Propaganda and the Building of a ‘National Community’ ( Volksgemeinschaft )
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 12270010 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David Welch (0000-0002-7066-2830, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1993 |
| Volumen | 2 |
| Número | 1 |
| Páginas | 1-15 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1993-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Contemporary European History (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0960-7773 • E-ISSN: 1469-2171 |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s096077730000028x |
| OpenAlex | W2134658890 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 8 |
The point has to be made at once that any attempt to quantify public reaction to Nazi propaganda is fraught with difficulties. Accurate measurement of the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda is weakened by the absence of public opinion surveys and the fact that, in a society that resorted so readily to coercions and terror, reported opinion did not necessarily reflect the true feelings and moods of the public, especially if these views were opposed to the regime. Nevertheless, to state that public opinion in the Third Reich ceased to exist is not strictly true. After the Nazi ‘seizure of power’ in 1933, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels stressed the importance of co-ordinating propaganda with other activities. In a dictatorship, propaganda must address itself to large masses of people and attempt to move them to a uniformity of opinion and action. But the Nazis also understood that propaganda is of little value in isolation. To some extent this explains why Goebbels impressed on all his staff at the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda the imperative necessity constantly to gauge public moods. Goebbels therefore regularly received (as did all the ruling élites) extraordinarily detailed reports from the Secret Police (SD reports) about the mood of the people and would frequently quote these in his diary. Hitler, too, was familiar with these reports, and his recorded determination to avoid increasing food prices at all costs for fear that this would undermine the regime's popularity suggests a political sensitivity to public opinion. To assure themselves of continued popular support was an unwavering concern of the Nazi leadership, and of Hitler and Goebbels in particular
Democracy · Dictatorship · Nazi Germany · Nazism · Political science · Politics · Popularity · Public opinion · Eastern European Communism and Reforms · German History and Society · History · Italian Fascism and Post-war Society · Law
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,06 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1994 - 2003 (10) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 2 |