Nigeria's military failure against the Boko Haram insurgency

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12337828
AutoresHabibu Yaya Bappah (North-West State Technical University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2016
Volumen25
Número2
Páginas146-158
Fecha de publicación2016-03-11
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAfrican Security Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1024-6029 • E-ISSN: 2154-0128
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10246029.2016.1151799
OpenAlexW2298206874
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas22

This article attempts to explain the apparent failure of Nigeria's military action against the Boko Haram (roughly translated as ‘Western education is prohibited’) insurgency in the north-east of the country. Until the involvement of troops from Chad and Niger in January 2015, the Boko Haram insurgents were succeeding in their effort to establish, or rather consolidate, an extreme version of the ‘Islamic state’ in parts of north-east Nigeria. For over five years, the military struggled to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria against Boko Haram, with little success. The war opened a Pandora's box, exposing a deep crisis in the military and the civilian leadership in Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgents were able to fly the flag of their ‘state’ in the territory of Nigeria. This article argues that the failure of the military action can be attributed to three factors: the erosion of military professionalism under civilian administrations since 1999; the poor handling of the war by the top military officers; and a lack of decisiveness in the leadership of President Jonathan and the military to end the insurgency

Boko haram · Criminology · Development economics · Economics · Insurgency · Islam · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Sovereignty · State (computer science · Terrorism · History · Law · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence