Malaya, 1948

Britain's Asian Cold War

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12746901
AutoresP Deery (0000-0002-2887-8910, The University of Melbourne, autor de correspondencia)
Año2007
Volumen9
Número1
Páginas29-54
Fecha de publicación2007-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Cold War Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1520-3972 • E-ISSN: 1531-3298
EditorialThe MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1162/jcws.2007.9.1.29
OpenAlexW2023553208
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas29

In 1948, at a time of severe economic austerity, the British Labour government committed itself to a costly and protracted campaign against a Communist foe in the Far East, despite not having any U.S. support for the endeavor. Clement Attlee's government in Britain argued that the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) was necessary to counter Soviet attempts to use the local Communist party in support of Moscow's expansionist designs. Subsequently, many commentators and historians accepted this judgment, at least to some degree. In reality, the rebellion, far from being carefully coordinated or meticulously organized, was inadequately planned and poorly executed. The 1948 insurrection cannot be understood without recognizing the influence of indigenous pressures and internal developments, which were more crucial than the external Cold War dimension

Austerity · Cold war · Communism · Economic history · Expansionism · Government (linguistics · Indigenous · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Commonwealth, Australian Politics and Federalism · History · Law · Military History and Strategy · World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact