Manufacturing the Illusion of Epistemic Trustworthiness

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12881663
AutoresTyler Porter (0000-0001-9343-3507, University of Colorado Boulder, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen22
Número2
Páginas576-595
Fecha de publicación2024-05-02
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEPISTÉMÈ (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1976-9660 • E-ISSN: 1750-0117
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/epi.2024.14
OpenAlexW4396583077
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas54

There are epistemic manipulators in the world. These people are actively attempting to sacrifice epistemic goods for personal gain. In doing so, manipulators have led many competent epistemic agents into believing contrarian theories that go against well-established knowledge. In this paper, I explore one mechanism by which manipulators get epistemic agents to believe contrarian theories. I do so by looking at a prominent empirical model of trustworthiness. This model identifies three major factors that epistemic agents look for when trying to determine who is trustworthy. These are (i) ability, (ii) benevolence, and (iii) moral integrity. I then show how manipulators can manufacture the illusion that they possess these factors. This leads epistemic agents to view manipulators as trustworthy sources of information. Additionally, I argue that fact-checking will be an ineffective – or even harmful – practice when correcting the beliefs of epistemic agents who have been tricked by this illusion of epistemic trustworthiness. I suggest that in such cases we should use an alternative correction, which I call trust undercutting

Business · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Illusion · Trustworthiness · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology