Exploring the Impact of Reserved Seat Design on the Quality of Minority Representation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12892012
AutoresCorinna Kroeber (0000-0002-9712-1647, University of Salzburg, autor de correspondencia)
Año2015
Volumen16
Número2
Páginas196-216
Fecha de publicación2015-06-11
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEthnopolitics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1744-9057 • E-ISSN: 1744-9065
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/17449057.2015.1051326
OpenAlexW2264963755
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas16
Referencias citadas37

This paper analyzes the effects of electoral rules for reserved seats in parliaments on representatives' ability and motivation to represent minorities. While most previous studies treat reserved seats as a uniform mechanism, the author argues that we can distinguish varieties along two attributes: electorate and candidacy. Limiting electorate means that only minority members can vote for reserved seat candidates, which motivates representatives to defend minority interests with the objective of optimizing re-election chances. Limiting candidacy to minority members obliges being a group member to all candidates for reserved seats, which improves minority members' acceptance of the political system they live in. Evidence from the case of indigenous people in New Zealand, Venezuela and Taiwan supports the fruitfulness of electoral rules for reserved seats as a factor explaining the quality of minority representation

Candidacy · Democracy · Electoral system · Ethnic group · Indigenous · Law and economics · Limiting · Minority group · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Quality (philosophy · Representation (politics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Gender Politics and Representation · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies