Legal Judgment as a Philosophical Archetype

A Pragmatist Analysis of Three Theses

Datos Bibliográficos

ID13002135
AutoresGiovanni Tuzet (0000-0003-4214-4275, Tibet University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen3
Número2
Fecha de publicación2011-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEuropean Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091
EditorialAssociazione Pragma (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.4000/ejpap.851
OpenAlexW2736391112
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas17

The article addresses three theses on judgment in general and legal judgment in particular, starting from Peirce’s and Dewey’s claims about them. The first thesis, ontological, concerns the content of an act of judgment and says that judgment is about an object instantiating a property (not about a property instantiated by an object). The second, alethic, concerns the relation between judgment and truth and says that judgment is the attribution of a truth value to a proposition. The third, genetic, deals with the moments of judgment claiming it is a process susceptible of being articulated in such moments. Its fundamental moments are 1) hypothesis, 2) inquiry, 3) result. The article claims that the three theses interconnect and hold for both judgment in general and legal judgment, given that the latter is a model of the former; so a complex conception of judgment is articulated, discussing also its relations with assertion and inference

Archetype · Assertion · Attribution · Epistemology · Inference · Object (grammar · Property (philosophy · Proposition · Relation (database · Computer Science · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law in Society and Culture · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology