More Talk, Less Need for Monitoring

Communication and Deterrence in a Public Good Game

Datos Bibliográficos

ID13015751
AutoresDavid C Kingsley (0000-0003-3325-6873, University of Massachusetts Lowell, autor de correspondencia), Daniel Muise (0000-0002-7137-0979, Stanford University)
Año2017
Volumen5
Número2
Páginas88-106
Fecha de publicación2017-12-26
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Experimental Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2052-2630 • E-ISSN: 2052-2649
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/xps.2017.33
OpenAlexW2778251430
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas42

This paper investigates the impact of communication in a public good game with a central authority. The central authority includes a fixed cost that increases with the level of monitoring which in turn determines the level of deterrence. The level of monitoring is both exogenously and endogenously determined. Across three treatments subjects either have no opportunity to communicate, communicate only when the level of monitoring is exogenously imposed, or communicate only when the level of monitoring is endogenously selected. Results suggest that, in both treatments, average earnings are significantly higher with the opportunity to communicate. Most significantly, with the opportunity to communicate prior to endogenous selection, groups practically eliminate monitoring (imposing a low cost, non-deterrent, central authority), while maintaining a high level of contributions. Communication appears to make groups less dependent on institutional deterrence and allows them to reduce the costs of central authority

Business · Cheap talk · Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Earnings · Economics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Opportunity cost · Political science · Public economics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Finance