Two-Level Luck Egalitarianism
Reconciling Rights, Respect, and Responsibility
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 13599099 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Johann Go (0000-0003-0293-095X, University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 55 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 543-566 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-07-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Journal of Value Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0022-5363 • E-ISSN: 1573-0492 |
| Editorial | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10790-020-09752-3 |
| OpenAlex | W3040827541 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
Luck egalitarianism is a broad theory of justice that emphasises the importance of responsibility (the pro-responsibility thesis), while minimising the effect of luck on people's life prospects (the anti-luck thesis). Luck egalitarians aim to compensate individuals for disadvantages that result through no fault of theirs, while holding responsible those who bring about their disadvantage through their own acts or omissions. There is something intuitively appealing about a theory of justice which aims to compensate people for morally arbitrary factors that influence their life prospects, while holding them responsible for the effects of their voluntary acts and omissions. After all, this seems to concur with our intuitions of fairness and responsibility. However, luck egalitarianism has been subjected to a number of criticisms. These include objections about luck egalitarianism's apparent disrespect for persons, its untenable metaphysical views about free will, and the lack of agreement on the appropriate metric to be distributed
Economics · Egalitarianism · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Luck · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |