Impetus Mechanics as a Physical Argument for Copernicanism Copernicus, Benedetti, Galileo

Datos Bibliográficos

ID14670841
AutoresMichael Wolff (0000-0002-2467-7062, autor de correspondencia)
Año1987
Volumen1
Número2
Páginas215-256
Fecha de publicación1987-09-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaScience in Context (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0269-8897 • E-ISSN: 1474-0664
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0269889700000375
OpenAlexW2119406139
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas19

The Argument One of the earliest arguments for Copernicanism was a widely accepted fact: that on a horizontal plane a body subject to no external resistance can be set in motion by the smallest of all possible forces. This fact was contrary to Aristotelian physics; but it was a physical argument (by abduction) for the possibility of the Copernican world system. For it would be explained if that system was true or at least possible. Galileo argued: only nonviolent motions can be caused by the smallest of all possible forces; hence resistance-free horizontal motions are nonviolent; this confirms Copernicanism insofar as it designates the rotations of celestial spheres (being resistance-free horizontal motions) as nonviolent. Galileo's argument was compatible with (and supportive of) the specific Copernican version of impetus mechanics; but it was also compatible with a (somewhat qualified) principle of inertia. Thus it promoted decisively the transition from impetus mechanics to classical inertial mechanics

Astronomy · Classical mechanics · Copernican principle · Copernicus · Epistemology · Geodesy · Geography · Inertia · Inertial frame of reference · Mechanics · Physics · Theoretical physics · Chemistry · History and Theory of Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Probability and Statistical Research