New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior
Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 14855441 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Vincent P Crawford (0000-0003-0532-0305, Vincent P. Crawford is Drummond Professor of Political Economy, University of Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, England. He is also Distinguished Professor Emeritus and Research Professor, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California. His email address is, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2016 |
| Volumen | 30 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 131-150 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965 |
| Editorial | American Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1257/jep.30.4.131 |
| OpenAlex | W2540022429 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 36 |
In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments
Cheap talk · Coordination game · Economics · Equilibrium selection · Game theory · Management science · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Repeated game · Strategic interaction · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Strategic Information Transmission
The Evolution of Conventions
The assignment game I
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Two-Person Cooperative Games
The Bargaining Problem
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Dyadic processes of disclosure and reciprocity in bargaining with communication
Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information
International Financial Crises
Cheap Talk
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |