How to Improve the Cooperation Mechanism of Emergency Rescue and Optimize the Cooperation Strategy in China
A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 15510476 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jida Liu (0000-0003-2985-5048, Harbin Institute of Technology), Yuwei Song (0009-0003-1091-5458, Harbin Institute of Technology), Shi An (0009-0003-6928-6895, Harbin Institute of Technology, autor de correspondencia), Changqi Dong (0000-0002-2806-6824, Harbin Institute of Technology, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2022 |
| Volumen | 19 |
| Número | 3 |
| Páginas | 1326-1326 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2022-01-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 1661-7827 • E-ISSN: 1660-4601 |
| Editorial | Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (PUBLISHER • CH) |
| DOI | 10.3390/ijerph19031326 |
| PMID | 35162349 |
| OpenAlex | W4210394647 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 4 |
| Referencias citadas | 43 |
To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject's strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject's strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a "mobilization-coordination" feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation
Business · Computer security · Economics · Emergency management · Emergency rescue · Game theory · Government (linguistics · Mechanism (biology · Medical emergency · Microeconomics · Process management · Computer Science · Disaster Management and Resilience · Evacuation and Crowd Dynamics · Facility Location and Emergency Management · Medicine
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| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |