The neuroethics of agency

The problem of attributing mental states to people with disorders of consciousness

Datos Bibliográficos

ID16824937
AutoresMarco Antônio Azevedo (0000-0003-4313-2612, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, autor de correspondencia), Bianca Andrade (0000-0003-1167-0563, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen20
Número1
Páginas235-250
Fecha de publicación2021-04-30
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
Revistaethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1677-2954 • E-ISSN: 1677-2954
EditorialUniversidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e80043
OpenAlexW3157161856
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas4

How can we be certain that another creature is a conscious being? One path is to rely on introspective reports we can grasp in communication or observation of their behavior. Another path is to infer mentality and consciousness by means of markers tied to their intentional behavior, that is, agency. In this paper we will argue that even if agency is a marker of consciousness in several normal instances (paradigmatically, for mature and healthy human beings), it is not a good marker in several pathological instances, such as the blindsight case, the vegetative state, the akinetic mutism and the locked-in syndrome. If we are right, this can be of great utility in neuroethics; for those kinds of disorders of consciousness are not, after all, instances of complete absence of consciousness

Blindsight · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Consciousness Disorders · Epistemology · GRASP · Introspection · Mental state · Minimally conscious state · Neuroethics · Persistent vegetative state · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments