The curious case of collective experience

Edith Stein’s phenomenology of communal experience and a Spanish fire-walking ritual

Datos Bibliográficos

ID19429331
AutoresTimothy Burns (0000-0001-9515-5088, autor de correspondencia), Timothy A Burns
Año2016
Volumen44
Número4
Páginas366-380
Fecha de publicación2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Humanistic Psychologist (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0887-3267 • E-ISSN: 1547-3333
EditorialAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/hum0000041
OpenAlexW2507892324
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas10

In everyday language, we readily attribute experiences to groups. For example, 1 might say, “Spain celebrated winning the European Cup” or “The uncovering of corruption caused the union to think long and hard about its internal structure.” In each case, the attribution makes sense. However, it is quite difficult to give a nonreductive account of precisely what these statements mean because in each case a mental state is ascribed to a group, and it is not obvious that groups can have mental states. In this article, I do not offer an explicit theory of collective experience. Instead, I draw on phenomenological analyses and empirical data in order to provide general conditions that a more specific theory of collective experience must meet in order to be coherent

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Health, and Society · Psychology