Making Essential Choices with Scant Information

Front-End Decision Making in Major Projects

Datos Bibliográficos

ID19901965
AutoresK Sunnevag, T Williams (0000-0002-0208-3431)
EditoresTerry M Williams, Knut Samset, Kjell J Sunnevåg
Año2009
Fecha de publicación2009-01-01
Open AccessSí
TipoBOOK
RevistaMaking Essential Choices with Scant Information (SOURCE_BOOK)
EditorialPalgrave Macmillan UK (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1057/9780230236837
OpenAlexW76571821
Open LibraryOL34540325M
ISBN9780230236837
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas16

This chapter reviews extant research on the quality of expert judgement of probability and risk.Both types of judgement are of great relevance to the concerns of this book, because expert judgement under uncertainty is a key component in the making of decisions with scant information.In the first section, we focus on the conditions under which experts have produced high quality assessments of probability -in terms of both the coherence and validity of assessed probabilities.We conclude that invalid probability judgements are common when features of the judgement domain are unfavourable and "learnability" is low -by which we mean that there is a lack of relevant background data and/or outcome feedback upon which to base and revise domain models.We identify judgement situations when such conditions are likely to be prevalent.We also show that use of ill-matched probability elicitation methods are a common operational flaw.We propose a task taxonomy that can be used to identify when expert probability judgements are likely to be well-made.Next, we consider whether expert judgements of risk -by which we mean judgements of the likelihood of occurrence of hazardous events -are of higher quality than those made by members of the general public.We evaluate the nine empirical studies that have been conducted on expert versus lay judgements of risk, and find that there is little empirical evidence for the propositions (1) that experts judge risk differently from members of the public or (2) that experts are more veridical in their risk assessments.We discuss the nature of expertise and consider whether the commonsense assumption of the superiority of expert risk assessors in making magnitude judgements is, in fact, sensible.We end with a discussion of future research directions

Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Psychology · Risk and Safety Analysis · Risk Perception and Management