The al-Qaeda Franchise
The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 19989481 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Barak Mendelsohn (autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2016 |
| Páginas | 288 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-01-28 |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Revista | Al Qaeda Franchise (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205607.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4245355644 |
| Open Library | OL28828488M |
| ISBN | 9780190205607 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 16 |
The al-Qaeda Franchise asks why al-Qaeda adopted a branching-out strategy, introducing seven franchises spread over the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. After all, transnational terrorist organizations can expand through other organizational strategies. Forming franchises was not an inevitable outgrowth of al-Qaeda’s ideology or its US-focused strategy. The book argues that al-Qaeda’s branching-out strategy was not a sign of strength, but instead a response to its decline in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Franchising reflected an escalation of al-Qaeda’s commitments in response to earlier strategic mistakes, leaders’ hubris, and its diminished capabilities. Although the introduction of new branches helped al-Qaeda create a frightening image far beyond its actual capabilities, ultimately this strategy neither increased the al-Qaeda threat, nor enhanced the organization’s political objectives. In fact, the rise of ISIS from an al-Qaeda branch to the dominant actor in the jihadi camp demonstrates how expansion actually incurred heavy costs for al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda Franchise goes beyond explaining the adoption of a branching-out strategy by exploring particular expansion choices. Through nine case studies, it analyzes why al-Qaeda formed branches in some arenas but not others, and why its expansion in some locations, such as Yemen, took the form of in-house franchising (with branches run by al-Qaeda’s own fighters), while other locations, such as Iraq and Somalia, involved merging with groups already operating in the target arena. It ends with an assessment of al-Qaeda’s future in light of the turmoil in the Middle East, the ascendance of ISIS, and US foreign policy
Al qaeda · Business · Franchise · Ideology · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Terrorism · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Marketing · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · Prevention · Qaida (Organization) · Recruiting · Terrorism, prevention · Terrorists · united states
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| Obras citantes distintas | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,14 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 16 |