Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20141986
AutoresWolfgang Barz (0000-0002-6902-2967, University of Duisburg-Essen, autor de correspondencia)
Año2014
Volumen80
Número4
Páginas350-367
Fecha de publicación2014-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12048
OpenAlexW1868026471
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas17

The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention to something extra‐mental should be epistemically justified in holding a belief about something intra‐mental . In his N aturalizing the M ind , F red D retske solves this problem by conceiving of introspection concerning visual experiences as an inference based on a connecting belief. Although D retske's account proves defective upon closer inspection, its essence can be salvaged by looking upon introspection as being a game of make‐believe

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Inference · Introspection · Mental image · Mental state · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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