Understanding the other from an inferentialist perspective

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20142019
AutoresHaruka Iikawa (0000-0003-3838-4997, Hitotsubashi University Kunitachi Japan, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen90
Número3
Páginas322-334
Fecha de publicación2024-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12534
OpenAlexW4399262352
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas21

‘The other’ is one of the mysteries of modern philosophy. Since the other is thought to be essentially different from the self, how we can understand each other is a difficult problem. In the first place, what does it mean to understand the other? I address this question from the perspective of normative inferentialism, by explicating what it means to understand the other's beliefs and actions. I propose that we should distinguish between attributional and fundamental understanding. While attributional understanding serves to specify the other's ways of thinking, fundamental understanding is an endorsement of them. Contrasting these two types of understanding gives us a rational picture of how people understand each other

Attribution · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Normative · Perspective (graphical) · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology