Fundamental Yet Grounded

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20142467
AutoresJoaquim Giannotti (0000-0002-4058-4093, Department of Philosophy University of Birmingham UK, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen87
Número3
Páginas578-599
Fecha de publicación2021-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12293
OpenAlexW3106449715
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas22

Grounding is claimed to offer a promising characterization of the fundamental as that which is ungrounded. Detractors of this view argue that there can be fundamental and yet mutually grounded entities. Such a possibility undermines the definition of the fundamental as the ungrounded. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entities does not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of grounding. To accomplish this aim, I defend a grounding‐based view that accommodates fundamental mutually grounded entities straightforwardly. My definition of fundamentality is similar to, but importantly different from, one that Karen Bennett discusses. I conclude by resisting two objections raised by Jessica Wilson against the Bennettian framework that also target the proposed view

Electrical engineering · Epistemology · Ground · Grounded theory · Qualitative research · Social science · Sociology · Engineering · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Herramientas

Abrir DOIOpen Access