Feit on the normative importance of harm
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 20142945 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anna Folland (0000-0002-7350-4010, Uppsala University Uppsala Sweden, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2023 |
| Volumen | 89 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 176-187 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2023-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12453 |
| OpenAlex | W4319789869 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 3 |
| Referencias citadas | 20 |
An important objection to the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) of harm is that the account fails to cohere with standard views about the normative significance of harm. In response, some proponents of CCA suggest that the concept of harm should play a more limited role in normative theorising than philosophers might usually think. This paper addresses the most elaborate defence of CCA of this sort, namely that by Neil Feit (2019) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 22, 809–823, and argues that it is unsuccessful
Counterfactual thinking · Epistemology · Harm · Law and economics · Normative · Political science · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 3 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 3 |