Friendship, Value and Interpretation

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20142997
AutoresJörg Löschke (0000-0003-2378-6766, University of Bern, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen83
Número4
Páginas319-340
Fecha de publicación2017-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12130
OpenAlexW2752359053
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas22

A widely held view concerning the justification of associative duties is the so‐called relationships view, according to which associative duties within personal relationships arise because of the value of those relationships. Against this view, it has been argued that there can be cases of undemanding friendships, that is, genuine friendships with no associative duties. In this article, I argue that undemanding friendships do not show that associative duties are not grounded in the value of the relationship that gives rise to them by providing an interpretivist account of the normativity of friendships. I argue that friendships are complex values that need to be interpreted in order to determine which response to them would be appropriate, and that understanding one's friendship as undemanding is one valid interpretation of the value of friendship. Subsequently, I demonstrate that this solution is not ad hoc , because friendship is not the only complex value that needs to be interpreted

Associative property · Epistemology · Friendship · Interpretation (philosophy) · Sociology · Value (mathematics) · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology