The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-realism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20143073
AutoresKaren Green (0000-0001-7570-3577)
Año2008
Volumen71
Número2
Páginas92-117
Fecha de publicación2008-02-11
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb01009.x
OpenAlexW2142429766
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas22

In his earlier writings, Dummett made a distinction between deep and shallow arguments for being suspicious of bivalence. Deep arguments brought with them a commitment to anti-realism, shallow arguments did not. This distinction was motivated by a certain understanding of the significance of the context principle, according to which it is the sentence which is the primary vehicle of meaning. In later writings Dummett has despaired of making clear the distinction between deep and shallow arguments for rejecting bivalence. He has adopted the position that all deviations from bivalence involve anti-realism of some kind. In this paper I argue that this in effect removes any clear connection between Dummettian anti-realism and idealism. A suspicion of bivalence should often be interpreted as the result of an anti-realim of the error theoretic kind

Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Idealism · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Realism · Sentence · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science