An Empiricist View on Laws, Quantities and Physical Necessity

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20143191
AutoresLars-Göran Johansson (0000-0003-4116-7061, Uppsala University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2019
Volumen85
Número2
Páginas69-101
Fecha de publicación2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12176
OpenAlexW2911706528
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas32

In this article I argue for an empiricist view on laws. Some laws are fundamental in the sense that they are the result of inductive generalisations of observed regularities and at the same time in their formulation contain a new theoretical predicate. The inductive generalisations simultaneously function as implicit definitions of these new predicates. Other laws are either explicit definitions or consequences of other previously established laws. I discuss the laws of classical mechanics, relativity theory and electromagnetism in detail. Laws are necessary, whereas accidental generalisations are not. But necessity here is not a modal concept, but rather interpreted as short for the semantic predicate “... is necessarily true”. Thus no modal logic is needed. The necessity attributed to law sentences is in turn interpreted as “necessary condition for the rest of the theory”, which is true since fundamental laws are implicit definitions of theoretical predicates use in the theory

Electromagnetism · Empiricism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Modal · Modal logic · Physical law · Physics · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Theoretical physics · Theory of relativity · Computer Science · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History