Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20143353
AutoresStefan Rinner (0000-0002-0008-3884, Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Studies Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich Munich Germany, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen90
Número1
Páginas8-16
Fecha de publicación2024-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12504
OpenAlexW4389426166
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas18

So‐called Neo‐Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘ is ’ in a context is the singular proposition o, P, where is the referent of the name in , and is the property expressed by the predicate in . This is also known as the Neo‐Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo‐Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo‐Russellian theory

A priori and a posteriori · Conjecture · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Goldbach's conjecture · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Property (philosophy) · Proposition · Pure mathematics · Referent · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · History · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science