What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledge

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20143617
AutoresPeter Baumann (0000-0003-0991-6288, Department of Philosophy Swarthmore College Swarthmore Pennsylvania USA, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen90
Número1
Páginas109-121
Fecha de publicación2024-02-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12512
OpenAlexW4391723183
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas20

According to subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that p depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non‐epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non‐epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes‐based SSI holds that two subjects can be in the same epistemic position with respect to some proposition but with different stakes for the two subjects so that one of them might know the proposition while the other might fail to know it. It is remarkable that the notion of stakes has not been discussed much in great detail at all so far. This paper takes a closer look at this notion and proposes a detailed, new analysis. It turns out that there is more than one kind of stakes, namely event‐stakes, knowledge‐stakes and action‐stakes. I discuss several issues that even plausible notions of stakes raise and propose solutions

Action (physics) · Economics · Epistemology · Event (particle physics) · Position (finance) · Proposition · Subject (documents) · Warrant · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science