Is Dickie's Account of Aboutness‐Fixing Explanatory
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 20143670 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jessica Pepp (0000-0002-1177-4242, Uppsala University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 86 |
| Número | 6 |
| Páginas | 801-820 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-12-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12259 |
| OpenAlex | W3039583895 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 2 |
| Referencias citadas | 7 |
Imogen Dickie's book Fixing Reference promises to reframe the investigation of mental intentionality, or what makes thoughts be about particular things. Dickie focuses on beliefs, and argues that if we can show how our ordinary means of belief formation sustain a certain connection between what our beliefs are about and how they are justified, we will have explained the ability of these ordinary means of belief formation to generate beliefs that are about particular objects. A worry about Dickie's approach is that the explanation it offers is circular and thus not a genuine explanation of mental aboutness. This article develops a version of that worry in detail and turns it aside. Nonetheless, I argue that the explanatory value of the account remains unclear. While it does promise a dialectical advance over traditional theorizing about aboutness, it does not reveal how our ordinary means of belief formation make beliefs be about what they are about
Aside · Cognitive reframing · Dialectic · Epistemology · Explanatory model · Intentionality · Linguistics · Sociology · Worry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citas por año | 1 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Altamente citado | No |