Deo Parere Libertas Est

Stoic Echoes in Wittgenstein’s Conception of Destiny

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20249806
AutoresBegoña Ramón Cámara (0000-0003-4591-7704, Universidad de Murcia, autor de correspondencia)
Año2025
Volumen17
Número1
Páginas26
Fecha de publicación2025-12-25
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaReligions (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444
EditorialMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/rel17010026
OpenAlexW7117310590
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas23

My aim in this paper is to examine some aspects of the relationship between the concepts of God, destiny, and happiness in Wittgenstein’s writings. The analysis is done—to use an expression of the philosopher’s own—by contrast with and against the background of Roman Stoicism’s views on this matter, mainly Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. The different uses of the concept of God that appeared in their texts are analysed, and the relationship between the notions of destiny, self-sufficiency, and happiness is clarified. Several similarities between Wittgenstein and Roman Stoics are traced, among others, those relating to the sense of the principle of distinction between what depends on oneself and what does not, the primacy of inner life as an absolute alternative to the impossible mastery of the world of facts, and the ideas of a serene acceptance of adversity and of happiness as peace of mind

Buddhism · Happiness · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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