The Argument from Non-belief
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 20311368 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Theodore M Drange (West Virginia University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1993 |
| Volumen | 29 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 417-432 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1993-12-01 |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Editorial | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412500022502 |
| OpenAlex | W1989762518 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 9 |
| Referencias citadas | 3 |
Attempts have been made to prove God's non-existence. Often this takes the form of an appeal to the so-called Argument from Evil: if God were to exist, then he would not permit as much suffering in the world as there actually is. Hence the fact that there is so much suffering constitutes evidence for God's non-existence. In this essay I propose a variation which I shall call ‘The Argument from Non-belief’. Its basic idea is that if God were to exist, then he would not permit as much non-belief in the world as there actually is. Hence the fact that there is so much non-belief constitutes evidence for God's non-existence
Appeal · Argument (complex analysis) · Belief in God · Epistemology · Existence of God · Political science · Theism · Augustinian Studies and Theology · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods
Why the problem of evil undermines the problem of divine hiddenness
Mutual epistemic dependence and the demographic divine hiddenness problem
Bolstering the Argument from Non-Belief
Is God's belief requirement rational
Divine hiddenness and special revelation
Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism
Divine hiddenness as divine mercy
Divine hiddenness, the demographics of theism, and mutual epistemic dependence
| Citas por año | 0,3 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citas | 1996 - 2025 (30) |
| Altamente citado | No |