God, fatalism, and temporal ontology

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20312759
AutoresDavid Kyle Johnson (0000-0003-3673-4180, The King's College, autor de correspondencia)
Año2009
Volumen45
Número4
Páginas435-454
Fecha de publicación2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaReligious Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0034412509990059
OpenAlexW2079441189
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas33
Referencias citadas21

Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe problem. A deep analysis of the arguments will reveal that, to avoid a fatalist conclusion, we must reject bivalence and adopt a specific kind of temporal ontology (presentism), which also forces the theist to embrace open theism

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Fatalism · Foreknowledge · Free will · Ontological argument · Ontology · Philosophy of religion · Set (abstract data type) · Theism · Computer Science · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil