A Teleological Critique of Modern Cognitivism

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20400577
AutoresJoseph F Rychlak (Loyola University Chicago, autor de correspondencia)
Año1995
Volumen5
Número4
Páginas511-531
Fecha de publicación1995-11-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheory & Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0959-3543 • E-ISSN: 1461-7447
EditorialSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0959354395054003
OpenAlexW2110414539
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas4
Referencias citadas22

This paper summarizes a teleological critique of modern cognitivism in terms of four points that address the suitability of such mechanistic accounts to explain human cognition: (1) Final-cause formulations are not required to understand mechanical processing, whereas human reasoning cannot be understood without them. (2) Computer theory is exclusively extraspective, but human reasoning demands an introspective theoretical account. (3) A mechanical process is limited to mediation, whereas human beings employ a predication process in their reasoning. (4) Human beings employ oppositionality, enabling them to reason according to a soft disjunction, whereas machines follow a Boolean logic that limits them to a hard disjunction in which only apposition is at play. Research reputed to be dealing with key criticisms of this paper is examined and found wanting. The author's research in support of predicational modeling is cited

Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Intentionality · Introspection · Sketch · Teleology · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology